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Tone from the Top in Risk Management: 
A Complementarity Perspective on How Control Systems Influence Risk Awareness 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Prompted by the weaknesses of standardized risk management approaches in the aftermath of the 
2008 financial crisis, scholars, regulators, and practitioners alike emphasize the importance of 
creating a risk-aware culture in organizations. Recent insights highlight the special role of tone 
from the top as crucial driver of risk awareness. In this study, we take a systems-perspective on 
control system design to investigate the role of tone from the top in creating risk awareness. In 
particular, we argue that both interactive and diagnostic use of budgets and performance measures 
interact with tone from the top in managing risk awareness. Our results show that interactive control 
strengthens the effect of tone from the top on risk awareness, while tone from the top and diagnostic 
control are, on average, not interrelated with regard to creating risk awareness. To shed light on the 
boundary conditions of the proposed interdependencies, we further investigate whether the 
predicted interdependencies are sensitive to the level of perceived environmental uncertainty. We 
find that the effect of tone from the top and interactive control becomes significantly stronger in a 
situation of high perceived environmental uncertainty. Most interestingly, tone from the top and 
diagnostic control are complements with regard to risk awareness in settings of low perceived 
environmental uncertainty and substitutes at high levels of perceived environmental uncertainty.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Prompted by the weaknesses of standardized risk management approaches in the aftermath 
of the 2008 financial crisis (Bromiley et al., 2015), scholars, regulators, and practitioners alike 
emphasize the importance of creating a risk-aware culture in organizations (Lam, 2014; Collier, 
Berry, & Burke, 2007; Mikes, 2009; 2011). Although the concept of risk culture is still blurry 
(Zeier Roeschmann, 2014), consensus has emerged that risk awareness is one of the fundamental 
pillars of risk culture (Collier et al., 2007). Drawing on insights from a Delphi study among both 
practitioners and academics, Melnyk et al. (2014) conclude that managing risk awareness is already 
important today but will gain in value and impact in the future. Despite the attributed importance 
of risk awareness, we have little empirical evidence on its antecedents.  
Risk awareness arises when all employees share and reflect on how their behavior and actions 
are related to causes and outcomes of potential risks to the firm (Braumann, 2018). In the case of 
high risk awareness, risk management becomes so engrained that it is almost invisible because all 
employees are managing risks already implicitly. Due to its intangibility, risk awareness per se 
cannot be implemented directly by a management decision, but management can take measures to 
raise risk awareness by creating an appropriate control environment. Recent insights highlight the 
special role of tone from the top1 – a central form of cultural control (Merchant & Van der Stede, 
2017) – as crucial driver of risk awareness (Collier et al., 2007; COSO, 2017). In this study, we 
take a systems-perspective on control system design (Grabner & Moers, 2013) to investigate the 
role of tone from the top in managing risk awareness. 
                                                          
1 The terms “tone at the top” and “tone from the top” are used synonymously in prior literature. Throughout the course 
of this paper we stick to the term “tone from the top” because we believe that this better captures the trickle-down 
effects this construct exhibits on employees. 
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In the risk management context, tone from the top comprises two dimensions: (1) a top-down 
approach including top management communication of commitment and behavioral expectations 
with regard to risk management, and (2) an encouragement for bottom-up communication and 
escalation of risk issues. Hence, to create an appropriate risk awareness, the CEO must be fully 
supportive of risk management, and set the tone for risk management behavior through 
communication and expectations. In doing so, the CEO signals commitment to risk management 
(Lam, 2014).  
We however argue that tone from the top in risk management does not work in isolation but 
rather in a system with other, more formal, control practices (Penno, 2019). In light of their 
widespread use and crucial importance in steering the firm, we focus on the interplay between the 
use of budgets and performance measures and tone from the top. Consistent with previous 
management accounting studies on risk management (Mikes, 2009; 2011), we look at budgets and 
performance measures through the lens of diagnostic and interactive control (Simons, 1995). In 
particular, we shed light on the interrelationship between tone from the top and both diagnostic and 
interactive use of budgets and performance measures.2 Complementarity implies that the benefits 
of one control practice increase with the use of another control practice and vice versa (Milgrom 
& Roberts, 1995). We expect that interactive control increases the effectiveness of tone from the 
top, and vice versa (H1). In particular, we argue that the interactive use of budgets and performance 
measures provides an especially well-suited forum for top management to display their tone from 
the top, walk the talk, and communicate their attitude toward risks to employees, which will in turn 
increase risk awareness. At the same time, tone from the top encourages employees to actively 
raise risk issues in the interactive budgeting process which will consequently translate into higher 
                                                          
2 In the remainder of the study, we use “interactive (diagnostic) use of budgets and performance measures” and 
“interactive (diagnostic) control” interchangeably.  
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risk awareness. Further, we present arguments for both, a complementary and substitutive 
interrelationship between tone from the top and diagnostic control. On one hand, we argue that the 
effect of tone from the top on risk awareness is strengthened by the use of diagnostic control as its 
monitoring nature communicates on which dimensions performance is desired, and hence gives 
employees a clear sense in which areas to reflect upon risk issues (Mundy, 2010; Merchant, 1985). 
On the other hand, we acknowledge that the use of diagnostic control might also dampen the effect 
of tone from the top on risk awareness, for example due to its focus on mistakes and negative 
variances (Henri, 2006). This focus limits the potential spectrum for risk-thinking by neglecting 
that, in terms of risk, areas of overperformance are often more informative than areas of 
underperformance (Van der Stede, 2009). Given that we are not able to theoretically determine ex-
ante, which arguments prevail, we formulate a research question and let the empirics shed light on 
the interrelationship between tone from the top and use of diagnostic control.  
To investigate the boundary conditions of our interaction effects, we further argue that the 
interrelationships are sensitive to the level of perceived environmental uncertainty (hereinafter, 
PEU). As PEU increases, a firm’s environment becomes riskier and more turbulent (Bstieler, 
2005). We posit that in this situation, the joint use of tone from the top and interactive control 
yields higher benefits in terms of risk awareness because predicting environmental changes and 
comprehending them becomes increasingly difficult (Bstieler, 2005). We therefore expect the 
complementarity between tone from the top and interactive control to be increasing under high 
PEU (H2a). With regard to diagnostic control, we expect that the positive features prevail in 
settings of low PEU (H2b), while the negative features prevail under high PEU (H2c). This implies 
that we predict a complementary relationship between tone from the top and diagnostic control for 
low levels of PEU (H2b), while we expect a substitution effect for high levels of PEU (H2c). 
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We test our hypotheses and research question using survey data on 198 small and medium-
sized enterprises (hereinafter, SMEs). The context of SMEs provides an ideal setting to test our 
theory. The limited number of employees makes it more likely that there is only one risk culture 
(Roelofsen, Blok, & Wubben, 2015) and that the CEO can credibly assess risk awareness. Further, 
CEOs tend to have the greatest impact in smaller firms (Miller & Toulouse, 1986), which makes 
SMEs an especially well-suited context to study tone from the top. Lastly, literature indicates that 
smaller firms provide a clearer setting with less confounding factors, and hence allow researchers 
to better study the consequences (in our case risk awareness) of management control practices 
(Mitchell & Reid, 2000).  
Supporting H1, we show that interactive control strengthens the effect of tone from the top 
on risk awareness, and vice versa. Regarding the interdependence of tone from the top and 
diagnostic control, our results yield an insignificant interaction effect on risk awareness. Taking a 
contingency perspective, our findings support H2a: the positive interaction between tone from the 
top and interactive control becomes significantly stronger in a situation of high PEU. Our results 
also support H2b and H2c, indicating that tone from the top and diagnostic control are complements 
in settings of low PEU while they are substitutes under high PEU.   
Our study contributes to the management accounting literature in several related ways. First, 
we add to the emerging literature stream on the interdependence between management control 
practices (Grabner & Moers, 2013). We consciously chose to shed light on risk awareness as 
outcome variable to avoid using a broader productivity measure. The latter is rather problematic in 
cross-sectional studies given its potential to add systematic error (Grabner & Moers, 2013). Risk 
awareness has been argued to be a fundamental pillar of an appropriate risk culture (Lam, 2014; 
Collier et al., 2007). With risk awareness as dependent variable, we are thus able to more directly 
capture the intended objectives underlying the control system design choices for the purpose of 
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creating a sound risk culture. Further, by using two alternative approaches to capture 
complementarity, we investigate to what extent firms’ average control system choices are 
consistent with their effectiveness in managing risk awareness. We also consider the contextual 
effects of PEU, providing a more detailed understanding of the boundary conditions regarding the 
proposed complementarities (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006). In doing so, we follow up on recent 
calls that contingency-based arguments can be fruitfully expanded to the level of interactions in 
management control research (Grabner & Moers, 2013). This also ties to Cassiman and Veugelers 
(2006) positing that in addition to analyzing interdependencies between organizational practices 
per se it is of even more value to shed light on the contextual factors that drive these 
interdependencies.  
Relatedly, we also contribute to prior risk management research. In considering the effect of 
tone from the top in a control system of broader sense, we follow the call of Janvrin et al. (2012) 
to provide insights into how tone from the top interacts with other control practices. We use the 
strengths of the SME context to capture tone from the top and elucidate its ramifications for risk 
awareness. In doing so, we follow the call to take a softer and more behavioral perspective on risk 
management (Landsittel & Rittenberg, 2010).  
Moreover, based on factors such as information overload, bounded rationality and the 
complex nature of risks, recent studies illustrate the shortcomings of formal risk management tools 
and emphasize the importance of creating an appropriate risk culture with risk awareness being a 
fundamental constituent of such a culture (Zeier Roeschmann, 2014; Collier et al., 2007). Research 
on the cultural aspects in risk management, however, is still at an infant stage due to the inherent 
difficulties of studying culture in large organizations. In this respect, SMEs prove to be a fruitful 
research context thanks to their restricted size. In considering risk awareness as outcome variable, 
we investigate a fundamental pillar of risk culture that can be influenced by choices regarding the 
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control environment (Lam, 2014; Collier et al., 2007). Further, while the concept of tone from the 
top has been touched upon in fields such as internal control systems (e.g., Morales, Gendron, & 
Guénin-Paracini, 2014), financial reporting (e.g., Hope & Wang, 2018), ethics (e.g., Weaver, 
Treviño, & Cochran, 1999), and tax issues (e.g., Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, & Graffin, 2015), 
it is surprising that empirical management accounting research lags behind in this regard. This is 
even more puzzling given that Merchant and Van der Stede (2017) identify tone from the top as a 
central form of cultural control. 
 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
The Importance of Risk Awareness 
Scholars, regulators, and practitioners increasingly emphasize the importance of creating risk 
awareness among employees (Lam, 2014; Mikes, 2009; 2011; COSO, 2017; Melnyk et al., 2014; 
Collier et al., 2007). Risk-aware people proactively identify the key risks for the company and 
seriously think about the impact of the risks they are responsible for (Lam, 2014). Hence, risk 
awareness is the result of all employees sharing and reflecting on how their behavior and actions 
are associated with causes and outcomes of potential risks to the firm (Braumann, 2018).  
When risk awareness is strong, company decision-makers can use this knowledge about key 
risks and be more responsive to changing environmental situations (Banks, 2012). Consequently, 
risk awareness, as a key cultural component of sound risk management, provides the very 
foundation for ERM success (Lam, 2014; Cormican, 2014). All employees in the company accept 
personal responsibility for the management of risk and encourage others to participate in this risk-
aware approach (COSO, 2017). The embedded risk-thinking ensures that employees throughout 
the organization have a clear understanding of what top management expects from them with 
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regard to dealing with risks in all their activities, ranging from strategic planning to daily operations 
(Collier et al., 2007).  
While conceptual and qualitative literature on risk management highlights the importance of 
risk awareness (Mikes, 2009; Aabo et al., 2005; Lam, 2014), empirical evidence providing insights 
into the drivers of risk awareness and its implications is limited (Braumann, 2018). 
Tone from the Top as Driver of Risk Awareness 
Tone from the top is viewed as an informal control practice that comprises common values, 
beliefs, and traditions and thus can direct the behavior of group members (Falkenberg & 
Herremans, 1995). It is a powerful form of cultural control (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2017) 
whose power emerges from its ability to manage the behavior of employees in ambiguous and/or 
unexpected situations where it addresses the limits of formal control systems that are however 
designed for specific and/or predictable events (Falkenberg & Herremans, 1995).   
Recent insights emphasize the special role of tone from the top as crucial driver of a risk-
aware culture (COSO, 2017; Collier et al., 2007). We thus conceptualize tone from the top as a 
control practice that focuses organizational attention toward risk (Henri, 2006) with the aim to 
strengthen risk awareness. In particular, we capture this broad concept of tone from the top by 
focusing on the CEO’s attention toward risk management from two dimensions: a top-down 
approach including the communication of commitment and behavioral expectations respective risk 
management, and a bottom-up encouragement for communication and escalation of risk issues. 
Regarding the former, to create an appropriate risk awareness, the CEO must dedicate her 
attention toward risk issues, be fully supportive of the risk management process, effectively convey 
expectations respective risk management behavior, and foster communication and escalation of 
risk issues (Lam, 2014; COSO, 2017). This tone from the top sets the stage that risk management 
per se matters, because if firm leaders believe in being risk-aware and dedicate their time, effort 
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and resources to risk issues, then others in the company will follow the lead. This top-down 
approach is important for leaders to establish their commitment and to communicate behavioral 
expectations toward risk issues to all levels (COSO, 2017; Zeier Roeschmann, 2014; Boultwood 
& Dominus, 2014). Regarding the latter, effective tone from the top further includes a bottom-up 
perspective where management motivates communication and escalation of risk issues from lower 
to upper levels. In doing so, management creates an atmosphere of transparency and trust (Amernic 
et al., 2010; Lam 2014), signals to be accessible and interested in open communication (Detert & 
Trevino, 2010), and encourages and supports openness to challenge (Banks, 2012; Lam, 2014).  
Theory Development 
Contemporary research suggests that tone from the top most likely does not work in isolation 
in creating risk awareness but rather in a system with other, more formal control and/or risk 
management practices (Grabner & Moers, 2013; Penno, 2019). Given that SMEs typically place 
less emphasis on enterprise risk management (ERM) than larger firms (Paape & Speklé, 2012; 
Beasley, Clune, & Hermanson, 2005), but instead use budgets and performance measures 
intensively for risk management purposes (Collier et al., 2007), we shed light on the 
interrelationship between tone from the top and the interactive and diagnostic use of budgets and 
performance measures. 
The complementarity between tone from the top and interactive control  
Interactive control entails the interpretation and discussion of performance measures and 
budget data in face-to-face meetings between top management and employees (Mundy, 2010). Top 
managers draw on the interactive use of budgets and performance measures to involve themselves 
regularly and personally in the decision activities of subordinates (Simons, 1995). At the same 
time, interactive control encourages reflection and learning throughout the organization since 
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attention is focused on the information contained in performance measures and budgets (Henri, 
2006). While prior papers argue that top managers rely on interactive control to send signals 
throughout the organization (e.g., Widener, 2007; Henri, 2006), literature remains rather silent 
about the content nature of these signals. We argue that tone from the top sends a content-related 
signal in the sense that it explicitly puts risk issues on employees’ agendas. 
The use of interactive control reinforces the effect of tone from the top on risk awareness for 
the following reason. The interpretation and discussion of performance measures and budget data 
in face-to-face meetings between top management and employees enables the former to credibly 
display tone from the top and encourage employees to constantly reflect upon risk issues (Shapiro, 
2016). While tone from the top gives employees the right mindset with regard to risk issues, the 
interpretation and analysis of the data generated by budgets and performance measures is also 
necessary for employees to promote learning and develop risk awareness. We hence argue that 
interactive control strengthens the effect of tone from the top on risk awareness.  
At the same time, tone from the top is also likely to complement interactive control with 
regard to risk awareness. Interactive processes sometimes tend to be suppressed in the sense that 
debate and challenges are carefully managed to the executive’s agenda (Roberts, 1990). Such a 
suppression carries the problem that risks and threats are addressed at the convenience of senior 
management, rather than at the most appropriate time for the firm (Mundy, 2010). This will also 
limit subordinates’ motivation to share knowledge and participate in debates about risk issues, 
hampering the effectiveness of interactive control with regard to risk awareness. An appropriate 
tone from the top, however, establishes a set of values espoused by top management regarding risk 
management. In doing so, tone from the top puts risk issues on employees’ agendas and indicates 
that top management expects employees to raise risk issues during interactive control (Lam, 2014; 
COSO, 2017). Through reinforcing a collective understanding that subordinates are highly 
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encouraged to reflect on risk and actively raise risk issues, interactive control will entail more trust 
and open communication between superiors and subordinates. Doing so, tone from the top 
increases the effect of the interactive use of budgets and performance measures on risk awareness 
by creating an environment that values openness and constructive challenge and debate (Simons, 
1995). 
Drawing on complementarity theory (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995), it hence follows that tone 
from the top and interactive control are complementary choices because the benefits (i.e., increased 
risk awareness) of tone from the top toward risk management increase with the increasing use of 
interactive control and vice versa (Grabner & Moers, 2013). Stated formally: 
Hypothesis 1: Tone from the top and interactive control are complements with regard to risk 
awareness. 
The interdependence of tone from the top and diagnostic control  
Diagnostic control involves the use of budgets and performance measures to monitor the 
achievement of pre-defined targets (Simons, 1995). Typically, the focus is set on the 
accomplishment of goals by correcting deviations from pre-set performance standards. Critical 
performance variables are monitored to coordinate the implementation of intended strategies 
(Henri, 2006). Furthermore, diagnostic control establishes accountability and focuses on exception-
based monitoring (Bedford, Malmi, & Sandelin, 2016). Due to its monitoring nature, diagnostic 
control is an effective means for communicating on which dimensions performance is desired 
(Merchant, 1985).  
The interplay of tone from the top and diagnostic control with regard to risk awareness is not 
straightforward. On the one hand, tone from the top and diagnostic control might complement each 
other, meaning that in combination they are more useful for strengthening risk awareness. The use 
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of diagnostic control is a mechanism for top management to reinforce tone from the top by 
encouraging subordinates to look for performance improvements within an explicitly defined space 
laid out by budgets and performance measures (Mundy, 2010). The effect of tone from the top on 
risk awareness may thus be strengthened by the use of diagnostic control since it communicates 
desired performance dimensions and gives employees the motivation and direction on where to 
reflect upon risk issues (Widener, 2007; Bisbe & Otley, 2004). Equally, tone from the top can have 
implications for the effect of diagnostic control on risk awareness. Typically, diagnostic control 
gives employees leeway in how desired outcomes are to be achieved (Bedford et al., 2016), and 
consumes less top management attention compared to interactive control due to top management 
intervening only in the case of deviations (Widener, 2007). However, while employees might 
cherish this autonomy and absence of top management, this may have negative implications for 
risk awareness. The missing guidance when using diagnostic control only might attract employees’ 
attention toward minimizing performance deviations in order to meet short-term targets (Bedford, 
2015), and moreover draw their attention away from shifting circumstances, hence hampering risk 
awareness (Van de Ven, 1986). Tone from the top countervails these negative effects by providing 
guidance, setting expectations and reminding employees of the importance of not sacrificing 
reflection upon risk issues for delivering short-term performance. 
On the other hand, tone from the top and diagnostic control may also be substitutes with 
regard to risk awareness. Diagnostic control focuses on mistakes and negative variances (Henri, 
2006), thus limiting the potential spectrum for risk-thinking by neglecting that, in terms of risk, 
areas of overperformance are often more informative than areas of underperformance (Van der 
Stede, 2009). Therefore, the use of diagnostic control could dampen the effect of tone from the top 
on risk awareness because employees tend to place too much weight on negative deviations. 
Further, it could confuse employees when a firm has diagnostic control in place but also signals 
 13 
through tone from the top the importance of being critical and challenging toward assumptions, 
beliefs, and associated risks. At the same time, discussions triggered by diagnostic control might 
at best lead to incremental corrective actions and at worst, cause discussions about unproductive 
topics such as the validity of the numbers (Henri, 2006). Thus, the joint use of both control practices 
might communicate conflicting expectations with regard to risk-related behavior and action and 
thus inhibit risk awareness.  
These competing arguments result in tension regarding the interdependence of tone from the 
top and diagnostic control with regard to risk awareness. As illustrated above, no clear rationale 
exists for making inferences on both the existence of an interrelationship and the nature of such an 
interrelationship. Therefore, we propose the following research question: 
Research Question: Are tone from the top and diagnostic control complements, substitutes or 
independent with regard to risk awareness? 
The boundary effect of perceived environmental uncertainty 
Given the important role of PEU as contextual factor in both management control 
(Chenhall, 2003) and risk management research (Gordon et al., 2009), we next use PEU to analyze 
the “boundary conditions” of our proposed interdependencies in the risk management context.  
As PEU widens the gap between the information known and the information desired for 
decision-making (Gordon et al., 2009), organizations face a higher demand for information 
collection and information processing (Galbraith, 1973). Prior work hence suggests that using 
budgets and performance measures interactively is more effective in uncertain environments 
(Bedford, 2015; Widener, 2007). We extend this line of reasoning to the complementary 
relationship between tone from the top and interactive control. The need for information collection 
and processing, guidance and flexibility is more pressing in a situation of high PEU as compared 
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to a stable environment. In a setting of high PEU, employees will perceive more lack of direction 
(Grabner, Posch, & Wabnegg, 2018), perceive a greater risk of organizational failure, experience 
a lack of confidence and fear that their decisions could cause trouble (Agle, Nagarajan, Sonnenfeld, 
& Srinivasan, 2006; Bstieler, 2005). Thus employees will seek more guidance regarding risk. 
Given the obstacles employees face in uncertain environments, we expect that combining tone from 
the top with interactive control is more beneficial in giving this guidance and subsequently more 
effectively translates into risk awareness compared to low levels of PEU. Stated formally: 
Hypothesis 2a: The complementarity between tone from the top and interactive control is 
stronger under high levels of perceived environmental uncertainty.  
Previous literature indicates that the effectiveness of diagnostic control hinges on goals and 
critical success factors being stable enough to incorporate them accordingly in budgets and 
performance measures (Simons, 1995; Su, Baird, & Schoch, 2015). As this is the case in settings 
of low PEU, diagnostic control serves as reinforcement mechanism of tone from the top by giving 
employees direction and providing them with reliable decision-relevant information regarding risk-
related behaviors. At the same time, tone from the top complements diagnostic control by setting 
boundaries to the short-term focus of diagnostic control and encouraging reflection about risk 
issues that goes beyond the typical scope of diagnostic control. In a setting of low PEU, we thus 
argue that the joint use of diagnostic control and tone from the top will complement each other 
with regard to risk awareness.  
Following the notion that diagnostic control can be problematic in dynamic environments 
(Widener, 2007), we argue that the nature of the interrelationship between tone from the top and 
diagnostic control changes when companies face high levels of PEU. The presence of high levels 
of PEU significantly increases the need to process information, while employees also seek more 
guidance and direction for their risk-related behavior (Agle et al., 2006). This however, is at odds 
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with diagnostic control being characterized by highly structured channels of communication and 
restricted flows of information (Henri, 2006). By virtue of these two characteristics prior literature 
argues that diagnostic control might hamper learning and the generation of new knowledge (Henri, 
2006). We suggest that high levels of PEU unlock this negative feature of diagnostic control. 
Furthermore, under high levels of PEU, budgets and performance measures become less precise 
and defining meaningful targets becomes more difficult (Govindarajan, 1984; Widener, 2007). 
Consequently, employees might struggle to interpret the information generated by diagnostic 
control and experience a misfit between tone from the top and diagnostic control. The lack of 
direction experienced by employees will consequently undermine the positive effect of tone from 
the top on risk awareness. This implies that the benefits of tone from the top in fostering risk 
awareness decrease with the increasing use of diagnostic control, and vice versa under high levels 
of PEU. We thus state formally: 
Hypothesis 2b: Tone from the top and diagnostic control are complements under low levels of 
perceived environmental uncertainty. 
Hypothesis 2c: Tone from the top and diagnostic control are substitutes under high levels of 
perceived environmental uncertainty. 
 
EMPIRICAL STUDY 
Empirical Setting and Sample Description 
To test our hypotheses and research question, we collect data using a cross-sectional survey 
design. Prior to developing our survey instrument, we conducted several interviews with CEOs and 
CFOs of SMEs in different industries to identify their approaches to managing risk. In particular, 
we asked about the company’s business environment, risk culture, risk management processes and 
tools, responsibilities and decision-making processes in risk management, and what factors 
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influence the development of risk management activities. From these interviews, we find that 
SMEs do not focus on implementing many risk management processes per se, but integrate risk 
management aspects into existing control processes. Furthermore, decision-making and design 
choices with regard to risk management are highly influenced by top management in order to 
control and ensure that employees think about their behavior in pursuing the company’s goals. Our 
interview findings are consistent with the limited evidence in the literature (Collier et al., 2007; 
Falkner & Hiebl, 2015).  
Survey data were collected by using an online questionnaire that was sent to CEOs of 
Austrian small and medium-sized non-financial companies. The selection of firms contacted was 
based on data obtained from the Aurelia database (Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing). For the 
purpose of this study, we defined companies with 25 to 250 employees as SMEs. The following 
industries are included in our sample (number of firms in brackets): manufacturing (76); wholesale 
trade (38); construction (34); retail trade (16); professional, scientific, and technical services (13); 
transportation and warehousing (10); and others (11).  
The specifications described above resulted in a target population of 3,286 firms, out of 
which a random sample of 1,500 firms was drawn. We then hand-collected the contact information 
of the CEO in these organizations either from a public source, or by contacting the company 
directly. CEOs were chosen since it can be assumed that they are the most knowledgeable 
respondents with regard to risk management and management control decisions in SMEs (Grabner, 
2014). Furthermore, they provide a reliable picture on tone from the top and how it translates into 
risk awareness. Given a lack of retrievable information on 65 managers, this process resulted in a 
total of 1,435 firms, which were contacted via e-mail and asked to fill in a structured online 
questionnaire in June and July 2016. Over this period, we sent out three reminder emails and 
conducted follow-up calls, achieving a total of 204 completed questionnaires and a resulting 
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response rate of 14.2%. Due to incomplete questionnaires, we deleted six observations resulting in 
a final sample of 198 companies. The average firm in our sample had 74.29 employees (s.d.: 62.50) 
and was 57 years old (s.d.: 67). 
We addressed a potential non-response bias in two ways. First, we did not find any 
meaningful differences between early and late respondents in regard to the items used in the survey. 
Second, testing for the representativeness of the responding companies regarding industry 
distribution and company size, we find no meaningful differences compared to the target 
population. The results hence reveal that non-response bias should not pose a threat to the validity 
of our results. 
A potential problem of survey studies is common method bias (CMB) (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). Upfront we note that interaction effects are less likely to be 
susceptible to common method bias since they are unlikely to be part of respondents’ cognitive 
maps. Along these lines, Siemsen, Roth, and Oliveira (2010) demonstrate that the presence of 
common method bias can only deflate interaction effects. Therefore, Siemsen et al. (2010, 469) 
argue that “finding significant interaction effects despite the influence of CMB in the data should 
be taken as strong evidence that an interaction effect exists”. We nevertheless address the potential 
problem of CMB ex-ante through the design of the survey instrument and ex-post using statistical 
controls in multiple ways. In line with Podsakoff et al. (2012), we attempt to countervail potential 
biases in responses through (1) psychologically separating the measurement of the dependent and 
independent variables; (2) protecting respondents’ anonymity, and (3) counterbalancing the order 
of the measurement of the dependent and independent variables. Ex-post we follow the 
recommendations of Podsakoff et al. (2012). Next to the typical Harman‘s single-factor test (which 
suggests that CMB is not a problem in our dataset), we also apply both the unmeasured latent 
method factor technique and the marker variable method. To assess the potential effects of CMB, 
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we add an additional latent method factor to our structural model. We then allow all the manifest 
variables to load on both their theoretical constructs as well as on the latent method factor to assess 
the amount of variance in the measurement model that is caused by measuring all of the items using 
the same survey instrument. The results of this procedure indicate that the model fit was improved. 
However, the variance explained by the newly added latent variable amounts to .18, which is fairly 
below the recommended cutoff value of .50 (Posch & Garaus, 2019). Further, we also include 
“employee turnover” as a marker variable that is unrelated to our substantive variables of interest 
(Podsakoff et al., 2012). The marker variable is not significantly related to any of the variables in 
the model. Furthermore, the partial correlations between the substantive variables of interest remain 
statistically significant while controlling for the marker variable (Podsakoff et al., 2012). Finally, 
the average path coefficient between the latent marker variable and the constructs of the study 
amounts to only .11, which is well below the common threshold of .30 (Posch & Garaus, 2019). In 
light of the results of our statistical tests, and the fact that our analyses focus on interaction effects 
we hence feel confident that our findings are not driven by the presence of CMB in our dataset.  
Variable Measurement 
All variables in this study were collected through a structured survey with closed-ended 
questions. Where possible, existing multi-item constructs were adopted from prior literature and 
slightly adapted to fit the specific empirical setting. Most variables are multi-item constructs 
measured on a Likert scale with a range from 1 to 7. The respondents were asked to assess to what 
extent the statements applied in their organizations with the end points anchored as 1 “does not 
apply” and 7 “fully applies”. 
We took several further steps to establish the validity of the survey constructs. We conducted 
several rounds of pretests with four academics and two CEOs. While we instructed the academics 
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to focus on the academic quality of the questionnaire, the interviews with practitioners mostly 
aimed at clarifying the terminology and enhancing the comprehensibility of the questions. 
Furthermore, we use both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, calculate Cronbach’s 
alpha, and review the item scale for our constructs to establish both content and construct validity. 
Table 1 Panel A reports the results of common factor analyses used to support the 
unidimensionality of the reflective constructs (the results of confirmatory factor loadings are very 
similar in terms of factor loadings). For the formative constructs we examine item weightings 
obtained from principal components analysis. The items on all formative constructs are positive 
and have weights above the recommended minimum of 0.30 (Bedford & Malmi, 2015; Hair et al., 
2011). To arrive at the final score for our variables, we average the responses across the items of a 
construct for the formative constructs used. For the reflective constructs we use factor scores 
obtained from common factor analysis (Mahlendorf, Kleinschmit & Perego 2014).3 Factor scores 
include only that part of the item that is shared with the other items, and excludes unique variance 
(Coltman, Devinney, Midgley, & Venaik, 2008). The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 show 
that all variables comprise a broad range with a minimum close to 1 and a maximum close to 7. 
Furthermore, the multi-trait matrix presented in Table 3 provides further support for the 
discriminant validity of the survey constructs because the Cronbach’s alphas on the diagonal 
exceed inter-construct correlations in all cases.  
To further corroborate the discriminant validity between our key variables risk awareness, 
tone from the top (i.e., top-down communication, bottom-up escalation), interactive control, and 
diagnostic control, we perform a hierarchical model comparison using confirmatory factor analysis 
                                                          
3 In an untabulated robustness check, we reran all our analyses with equally weighted means for all our constructs 
instead of using averages for formative constructs and factor scores for reflective constructs. All of the findings remain 
inferentially identical. 
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(Choi, Lee, & Yoo, 2010). Following Choi et al. (2010), we estimate three different comparison 
models: (1) a null model, (2) a single-factor model where all 22 items load on a single factor, and 
(3) a five-factor model with any correlation between the factors fixed to one. A comparison of 
differences in chi-square statistics reveals that the five underlying factors are different from one 
another and that the correlations between them are statistically different from unity (Choi et al., 
2010). The results of this analysis thus suggest that risk awareness, top-down communication, 
bottom-up escalation, interactive control, and diagnostic control display satisfactory discriminant 
validity. Finally, we also applied the Fornell-Larcker criterion (1981) to analyze the discriminant 
validity between the focal constructs of our study. In line with the Fornell-Larcker criterion (1981), 
the square root of the AVEs for our constructs consistently exceeds the interconstruct correlations. 
Overall, the statistical analyses consistently underscore that our constructs display satisfactory 
discriminant validity.  
---- Insert Table 1 about here ---- 
---- Insert Table 2 about here ---- 
---- Insert Table 3 about here ---- 
Outcome variable 
Risk awareness (RA) is measured based on a scale adapted from Braumann (2018), and 
further refined based on conceptual, theoretical and practitioner studies (Lam, 2014; Boultwood & 
Dominus, 2014; Cormican, 2014; Collier et al., 2007). The variable comprises the following four 
dimensions: (1) employees are aware of what top management expects from them with regard to 
dealing with risks, (2) employees have embedded risk-thinking in their work modes, (3) employees 
take risk aspects into consideration in their decision-making process, and (4) risk-aware actions 
and behaviors sustainably influence business processes. All items load on one single factor with 
satisfactory reliability of α = 0.91. 
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Control practices 
Tone from the Top (TT) comprises two dimensions that are based on communication aspects 
of creating proper attention toward risk issues: (1) a top-down approach including top management 
communication of commitment and behavioral expectations with regard to risk management, and 
(2) an encouragement for bottom-up communication and escalation of risk issues. The construct is 
operationalized as higher-order latent variable (Becker, Klein, & Wetzels, 2012). It is measured as 
formative, second-order construct with two first-order reflective constructs: (1) top-down 
communication, and (2) bottom-up escalation.4 Top-down communication is based on Cormican 
(2014) and captures the extent to which top management (1) actively communicates risks and 
activities to be avoided by subordinates, (2) communicates the importance of considering risks in 
business activities to all employees, and (3) emphasizes risk awareness as active component of the 
organization’s culture. Bottom-up escalation captures the emphasis the CEO puts on ensuring the 
following aspects with regard to risk management: (1) open communication channels and the fast 
transfer of risk-related information, (2) informal and easy access to the top management team when 
it comes to important risk-related topics, (3) corporate culture that encourages employees to signal 
potential risks, (4) constructive challenge of beliefs, assumptions and associated risks, and (5) 
employees being comfortable about raising dissenting opinions with regard to risks. Due to the 
absence of an established survey-based measurement instrument in prior literature, the scale was 
purpose-developed based on interviews with practitioners, inspired by the constructs organic 
                                                          
4 Following the recommendations of Becker et al. (2012), we rely on the repeated-indicator approach to estimate tone 
from the top. The second-order latent variable tone from the top is specified using all (eight) manifest items of the 
underlying first-order latent constructs top-down communication and bottom-up escalation. The manifest items are 
hence used twice: (1) for the first-order latent variables (1st order loadings) and (2) for the second-order latent variable 
(2nd order loadings). 
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innovative culture (Chenhall, Kallunki, & Silvola, 2011) and constructive conflict (Danneels, 
2008).  
As Panel B in Table 1 indicates, the first-order reflective constructs display good 
measurement properties. Furthermore, both constructs significantly contribute to the formative 
second-order construct tone from the top (as indicated by the significant and positive formative 
weights). Given the fact that the formative measurement model is based on multiple regression, it 
is important to investigate the presence of multicollinearity (Fayard et al., 2012). Since the VIFs 
obtained are below the suggested cut-off value of 3 (Hair et al., 2011), the parameter estimates of 
the second-order model are not unduly influenced by multicollinearity. 
Interactive control (IC) is based on Bedford (2015) and covers the following five formative 
dimensions along which budgets and performance measures are used: (1) intensive use by top 
management, (2) intensive use by operating managers, (3) face-to-face challenge and debate, (4) 
focus on strategic uncertainties, and (5) non-invasive, facilitating and inspirational involvement 
(Bisbe, Batista-Foguet, & Chenhall, 2007). The wording of the five items is based on previous 
work on interactive control (Widener, 2007; Henri, 2006; Bisbe & Otley, 2004). 
Diagnostic control (DC) is measured based on Bedford (2015) and covers the following five 
dimensions along which budgets and performance measures are used: (1) identify critical 
performance variables (i.e., factors that indicate achievement of current strategy), (2) set targets for 
critical performance variables, (3) monitor progress toward critical performance targets, (4) 
provide information to correct deviations from preset performance targets, and (5) review key areas 
of performance. All items load on one single factor with satisfactory reliability of α = 0.90. 
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System-specific contextual variable 
Perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) is operationalized formatively based on an 
established scale adapted from Moers (2006), which measures the extent to which firms can predict 
(1) customer behavior, (2) competitor behavior, (3) technological changes in the industry, as well 
as the behavior and strategies of (4) suppliers, and (5) legal and/or political developments.5  
Control Variables 
Based on prior literature, we introduce several control variables to our model that might 
exhibit an influence on risk awareness and the investigated control practices.  
Formal risk management (FRM) is measured formatively based on Cormican (2014) and 
captures the extent to which a given firm has an established and comprehensive risk management 
process in place. We capture a firm’s strategic orientation in three different ways: The measures 
for Exploration and Exploitation are based on the work of Patel, Messersmith, and Lepak (2013) 
who developed items especially tailored to the context of SMEs. Risk-taking climate measures to 
what extent firms encourage employees to take calculated risks (García-Granero, Llopis, 
Fernández-Mesa, & Alegre, 2015).  
Outcome history (of risky decisions) is measured in line with Sitkin and Weingart (1995) and 
captures firms’ experience with taking risky decisions. Competitive intensity is measured in line 
with Jansen, Van den Bosch, and Volberda (2006), and captures the perceived degree of 
competition within the industry. The measurement properties of all constructs are satisfactory. 
We operationalize Size as the natural logarithm of the number of employees of a given firm. 
While we measure Growth with a single item capturing the extent to which a firm experienced 
                                                          
5 The 7-point Likert scale is reverse-coded (i.e., higher values indicate better predictability and hence lower levels of 
perceived environmental uncertainty). For all the analyses, we have recoded the variable so that higher scores imply 
higher levels of perceived environmental uncertainty. 
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significant growth in the past three years, Foreign sales is quantified as the percentage of sales 
generated abroad. To control for Industry, we introduce several dummy variables with 
manufacturing firms serving as baseline category. To control for time orientation, we use two 
dummy variables that capture medium time horizon (1 – 3 years) and long-term time horizon (more 
than 3 years) with short-term time horizon (up to 1 year) serving as baseline category. To control 
for ownership structure, we define a dummy variable External Management that takes on the value 
of 1 if the firm is a family firm (i.e., ownership exceeding 50%) and has a non-family CEO. Finally, 
we also control for firm age. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Empirical strategy 
Following Grabner and Moers (2013), we use two alternative strategies to test for 
complementarity, that is, (1) the payoff-function approach to directly test whether the effect of one 
control practice on risk awareness increases in the use of the other practice, and (2) the demand-
function approach to test whether the control practices, on average, are adopted as a system rather 
than in isolation. It is important to note that the general assumptions about optimality underlying 
each method are basically each other’s mirror image, which implies that one of these two tests 
tends to be strong when the other is weak (Grabner & Moers, 2013; Aral, Brynjolfsson, & Wu, 
2012).   
At the one extreme, the demand-function approach assumes that all firms understand the 
benefits of the complementarity and hence, make optimal decisions by adopting the control 
practices as a system instead of adopting only one of them in isolation. This would minimize the 
performance difference (in our setting, the difference in risk awareness) between adopter and non-
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adopter firms, thus leading to weak results on the payoff-function test. On the other extreme, 
ignorance of performance benefits of these choices on the part of managers would lead to weak 
results on the demand-function test but lend high power to the payoff-function test (Aral et. al, 
2012). Between these two extreme cases, if firms are still experimenting with their choices but on 
average tend to make optimal decisions, the demand-function test will show a significant 
conditional correlation between the adoption choices but then there would still be enough variation 
in terms of performance and a significant premium for the adopters versus the non-adopters of this 
system. The cross-tables reported in Table 4 support our assumption that this scenario is applicable 
to our setting. While in both cases there are observations in each of the four cells (supporting the 
view that firms are still experimenting), the pattern of joint adoption of the respective control 
practices is also visible (given that the low-low and high-high cells are overpopulated).  
---- Insert Table 4 about here ---- 
Regarding the payoff-function approach, we estimate the following model: 
RA = β0 + β1TT + β2IC + β3DC + β4TT*IC + β5TT*DC + β6FRM + β7GROWTH + 
β8AGE + β9SIZE + β10OUTHIS + β11PEU + β12FOREIGN SALES + β13EXPLORATION 
+ β14EXPLOITATION + β15-16TIME HORIZON_DUMMIES + β17EXTERNAL 
MANAGEMENT + β18RTC + β19CI + β20-25INDUSTRY_DUMMIES + εRA 
  
Following Hartmann and Moers (1999), we use hierarchical regression analysis to test the 
proposed interaction effects and the research question stated. We first report a model with only the 
control variables (Model 1), then include the main effects for tone from the top, interactive control, 
and diagnostic control (Model 2), and finally add the interaction terms (Model 3). In order to better 
interpret the main effects and avoid potential multicollinearity problems, all variables involved in 
interaction terms were mean-centered prior to the analyses (Hartmann & Moers, 1999).   
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Regarding the demand-function approach, we estimate conditional correlations between the 
respective control practices. In particular, we correlate the residuals of the following regressions:  
TT = β0 + β1GROWTH + β2AGE + β3SIZE + β4OUTHIS + β5PEU+ β6FOREIGN SALES 
+ β7EXPLORATION + β8EXPLOITATION + β9-10TIME HORIZON_DUMMIES + 
β11EXTERNAL MANAGEMENT + β12RTC + β13CI + β14-19INDUSTRY_DUMMIES + εTT 
 
IC = β0 + β1GROWTH + β2AGE + β3SIZE + β4OUTHIS + β5PEU+ β6FOREIGN SALES 
+ β7EXPLORATION + β8EXPLOITATION + β9-10TIME HORIZON_DUMMIES + 
β11EXTERNAL MANAGEMENT + β12RTC + β13CI + β14-19INDUSTRY_DUMMIES + εIC 
 
DC = β0 + β1GROWTH + β2AGE + β3SIZE + β4OUTHIS + β5PEU+ β6FOREIGN SALES 
+ β7EXPLORATION + β8EXPLOITATION + β9-10TIME HORIZON_DUMMIES + 
β11EXTERNAL MANAGEMENT + β12RTC + β13CI + β14-19INDUSTRY_DUMMIES + εDC 
 
Results 
The results of the interaction regression are reported in Table 5. Our full specification 
(Model 3) displays a satisfactory level of predictive validity with an R² of 0.44. To assess whether 
multicollinearity poses a threat to the validity of our results, we computed Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIF), and the results suggest that multicollinearity is of no concern to the validity of our 
results.  
Looking at the drivers of risk awareness, our findings in Table 5, Model 3 indicate that TT 
(β = 0.34, p < .01) exhibits a positive and significant main effect on risk awareness. Despite a 
positive regression coefficient, the effect of IC is not significant. Regarding the control variables, 
we find that FRM is significantly and positively associated with risk awareness (β = 0.18, p < .01). 
Furthermore, larger firms tend to display a higher level of risk awareness (β = 0.16, p < .10). On 
the contrary, competitive intensity is negatively associated with risk awareness (β = -0.12, p < .10). 
---- Insert Table 5 about here ---- 
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Panel A of Table 6 reports the regression results regarding the determinants of the control 
choices. TT and IC are positively and significantly associated with exploitation. Outcome history 
is positively and significantly associated with tone from the top. Interactive control is significantly 
and positively associated with risk-taking climate. Both size and a long-term time horizon exhibit 
positive and significant effects on all three control choices. IC and DC are positively related to 
competitive intensity. Panel B of Table 6 reports the conditional correlations between TT and IC 
and DC respectively.  
---- Insert Table 6 about here ---- 
The complementarity between TT and IC (H1) 
H1 predicts that the use of interactive control increases the effect of tone from the top on risk 
awareness, and vice versa. Looking at the interaction coefficients (Table 5, Model 3), we indeed 
find a significant and positive interaction effect between TT and IC (β = 0.15, p < .05). This finding 
is in line with H1 suggesting that interactive control complements tone from the top with regard to 
risk awareness. Further, the conditional correlation between the two control practices, as reported 
in Table 6, Panel B, is positive and significant (ρ = 0.33, p < .01). This suggests that in their control 
system design choices, firms on average treat these two control practices as complements and tend 
to adopt them as a system rather than in isolation. Overall, we hence find strong support for H1.  
The interrelationship between TT and DC (RQ) 
We state the interrelation of TT and DC with regard to risk awareness as research question. 
The interaction effect between TT and DC (Table 5, Model 3) is insignificant (β = -0.07, p > .10), 
indicating that there is, on average, no interrelationship between the two control practices with 
regard to risk awareness. In contrast, the conditional correlation between the two practices reported 
in Table 6 (Panel B) is positive and significant (ρ = 0.21, p < .01), indicating that, on average, firms 
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are more likely to adopt either both or none of the practices compared to only one of them. 
Interestingly, although the two control practices do not appear to be interrelated in terms of risk 
awareness, firms seem to treat them as complements in their control system design choices. Thus, 
we do not find conclusive evidence regarding the research question stated. 
The role of PEU (H2) 
 H2a predicts that the complementarity between TT and IC is more pronounced in a situation 
of high PEU compared to a situation of low PEU. H2b suggests that TT and DC are complements 
when PEU is low and substitutes when PEU is high. To test these predictions, we split the sample 
at the mean of PEU, and repeat the previous analyses in the respective sub-samples. While Table 7 
reports the results of the payoff-function test for high and low levels of PEU, respectively, Table 8 
reports the results of the conditional-correlation analysis. 
---- Insert Table 7 about here ---- 
---- Insert Table 8 about here ---- 
 In line with H2a, the interaction effect between TT and IC is significantly stronger in the 
high PEU sample. In fact, the complementarity with regard to risk awareness is only observed in 
this sub-sample (β = 0.37, p < .01). The difference in the coefficients between the sub-samples is 
also statistically significant (p < .01). However, we do not observe a difference in the conditional 
correlations between contexts of high versus low PEU (p-value = 0.76; Table 8, Panel A). These 
results imply that TT and IC only reinforce each other in increasing risk awareness in settings of 
high PEU, however firms do not take the role of PEU as a system-specific contextual variable into 
account in their control system design choices. Our results from the payoff-function approach 
support both H2b and H2c, since we find that TT and DC display a positive and significant 
interaction effect on risk awareness in settings of low PEU (β = 0.27, p < .05) and a negative and 
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significant interaction effect in the case of high PEU (β = -0.34, p < .05). The difference between 
the interaction effects across the two subsamples is also statistically significant (p < .01). The 
conditional correlations between TT and DC, however, do not differ across the two subsamples (p-
value = 0.86). 
Moreover, we also tested to which extent our results for H2 are sensitive to capturing PEU 
in a continuous way. We run alternative specifications with PEU as continuous variable for both 
the payoff-function approach (Table 9) and the demand-function approach (Table 8, Panel B). 
---- Insert Table 9 about here ---- 
 Regarding the payoff-function approach we run a regression model with two three-way 
interaction terms (TT * IC * PEU and TT * DC * PEU) (Table 9). In line with H1, the results reveal 
that the two-way interaction between TT and IC is positive and significant (β = 0.14, p < .05). 
Corroborating H2a, the three-way interaction between TT, IC, and PEU is significant and positive 
(β = 0.21, p < .01). This indicates that the complementarity between TT and IC increases with 
higher PEU. In the case of DC the two-way interaction between TT and DC is not significant  
(β = -0.06, p > .10), corroborating our initial findings. The three-way interaction term between TT, 
DC, and PEU is negative and significant (β = -0.26, p < .05), thus lending further support to H2b 
and H2c. 
 With regard to the demand-function approach, we follow Grabner (2014) and test the extent 
to which there is a positive interaction effect between PEU and the residuals of IC and DC, 
respectively, on the residual of TT (Table 8, Panel B). Supporting our conclusion drawn from the 
demand-functions main analysis, we do not find any significant interaction terms. This suggests 
that firms do not take the role of PEU as a system-specific contextual variable into account in their 
control system design choices.  
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Robustness checks 
We run several robustness checks to gauge the validity of our findings. Recently, papers on 
interrelationships between control practices have suggested using a modified payoff function that 
is more robust with regard to testing interrelationships between control practices (Masschelein & 
Moers, 2018; Bedford et al., 2016). This modified payoff equation adds context-control-practice 
interactions to the payoff function. In our case, we add product terms for PEU and TT, PEU and 
IC, as well as PEU and DC to the payoff function. The findings for H1 and the research question 
using the payoff-function approach remain robust using this regression specification.  
It could also be the case that risk awareness is driven by the firm’s exposure to different risks. 
To determine whether our results might be subject to an omitted-correlated-variable problem we 
regress risk awareness on risk categories firms are exposed to (i.e., strategic, operational, financial, 
IT, legal/regulatory, reputation, political). We then take the residuals obtained from this regression 
as measure for risk awareness, independent from the level of risks a company faces, and rerun all 
our analyses with this alternative dependent variable capturing risk awareness. The results remain 
both directionally and inferentially identical compared to the original analyses. 
Another set of organizational design choices that might be correlated with both risk 
awareness and the studied control choices are delegation of decision rights and formalization.6 To 
rule out that these potentially correlated omitted variables drive our results, we rerun all analyses 
including them as additional covariates. Again, all our findings and inferences remain unchanged. 
  
                                                          
6 We measure DELEGATION with a 3-item scale based on Hughes and Morgan (2007) and Hage and Aiken (1967) 
that captures the degree to which employees can make their own decisions within their assigned areas of responsibility. 
Further, FORMALIZATION is measured with a 3-item scale adapted from Hage and Aiken (1967) that captures the 
degree to which formalized rules are of importance and define roles and procedures of an organization. 
 31 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS  
In contrast to most prior complementarity studies in management accounting research, we 
use two alternative approaches to test for the interdependence of control practices. Thanks to this 
dual approach, we are able to investigate to what extent firms’ average control system choices are 
consistent with their effectiveness in terms of managing risk awareness. We show that interactive 
control strengthens the effect of tone from the top on risk awareness, and that firms at the same 
time tend to adopt these two choices in combination. These results indicate that indeed the two 
control practices complement each other in increasing risk awareness, and that firms, on average, 
take this complementarity into account in the design of the control system. 
On average there is no interrelationship between tone from the top and diagnostic control 
with regard to risk awareness (RQ) because the significant and positive interaction under low PEU 
(H2b) and the significant and negative interaction under high PEU (H2c) cancel each other out. 
We do, however, find that firms, on average, treat tone from the top and diagnostic control as 
complements in their control system design choices. This implies that firms’ control system design 
choices with regard to these practices are not consistent with their effectiveness in managing risk 
awareness. These diverging results open the door for some interesting observations. One possible 
explanation for this divergence is that decision makers have a different control problem other than 
managing risk awareness in mind when choosing to combine tone from the top and diagnostic 
control. It is quite possible that control practices are used to address several control problems. 
However, different control problems have different implications for control system design because 
the costs and benefits of adopting control practices jointly as a system are likely to vary across 
different control problems. In other words, a set of control practices might be complements in 
addressing one control problem but work independently or as substitutes with regard to another 
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one. This, of course, puts a burden on decision makers to decide which control problem is the most 
pressing one and how to go about the implications of leaving subsidiary control problems 
unaddressed. We think this is a fruitful avenue for future research meriting scholarly attention. 
Finally, the results regarding environmental uncertainty raise some interesting questions. Our 
results imply that TT and IC only reinforce each other in increasing risk awareness in settings of 
high PEU, while they are independent control choices when PEU is low. Furthermore, our analyses 
of demand functions for TT and DC reveals that firms do not adequately take the role of PEU into 
account when deciding upon the joint use of both control practices (assuming the underlying design 
consideration is indeed managing risk awareness). Upon closer investigation, it turns out that the 
non-significant interaction term between tone from the top and diagnostic control is driven by two 
opposing and significant effects offsetting one another. From the perspective of maximizing risk 
awareness, our results suggest that under low PEU both practices reinforce one another in driving 
risk awareness. In the context of high PEU, however, SMEs should either focus on tone from the 
top or diagnostic control but not use both controls simultaneously, since they are substitutes with 
regard to risk awareness in this setting. Our analyses of demand functions, however, reveals that 
there is no significant difference between the conditional correlations across low and high-PEU 
subsamples. 
Despite the fact that environmental uncertainty is considered as one of the most important 
and most widely studied contextual factors (Chenhall, 2003), our results thus show that firms, at 
least when it comes to control practices related to managing risks, do not take the role of PEU 
adequately into account in their control system design choices (assuming the underlying design 
consideration is indeed managing risk awareness). This might suggest that firms over-invest in 
control practices in settings of low PEU, or again that another control problem is more intensely 
affected by PEU. While our dataset does not allow for a closer examination of the different findings 
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between payoff-function and demand-function approaches, we consider studies with a similar 
methodological approach as a promising avenue for future research. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study investigates the drivers of risk awareness – a so far rather neglected outcome 
variable in prior research. Based on literature that casts doubt on the effectiveness of technocratic 
risk-management approaches (Paape & Speklé, 2012), we take a more behavioral perspective and 
investigate to what extent risk awareness is driven by the interplay between tone from the top and 
both interactive control and diagnostic control. Similar to prior studies in this area, we investigate 
the role of control system design to manage risks (Braumann, 2018; Posch, 2019; Ittner & Keusch, 
2017) – an area that is according to Mikes (2009, 37) “riddled with possibilities and tensions”. 
It is important that the findings of this study are interpreted in the context of their limitations. 
The obvious drawback of cross-sectional surveys is that they do not allow for the claim of causality. 
Any statements of causality in this paper are hence purely based on theoretical positions. Second, 
we use the same informant to collect both dependent and independent variables. Despite careful 
development of our survey instrument, extensive pre-testing, and good statistical validity and 
reliability, the data we use is of perceptual nature and may thus contain noise. A fruitful avenue for 
future research would hence be developing and using a more robust measure of risk awareness but 
also using other measures for tone from the top, e.g., based on linguistic analysis on earnings-
conference calls (Hope & Wang, 2018). Moreover, our analysis focuses on interactive and 
diagnostic use of budgets and performance measures only, which introduces a narrower focus on 
control practices compared to previous work (e.g., Bisbe & Malagueño, 2009). We leave it up to 
future studies to consider a broader range of control practices (e.g., strategic planning, guidelines 
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and rules, approval procedures, trainings, etc.). Relatedly, we acknowledge that our study only 
focuses on the use of budgeting for risk management purposes and hence abstracts away from other 
budgeting roles such as planning, performance evaluation and coordination (Arnold & Artz, 2019; 
Hansen & Van der Stede, 2004). Hence, future studies may investigate to what extent the risk-
management use of budgeting is conflicting with other roles of budgeting. Furthermore, our study 
aims at measuring the effect of control practices on company-wide risk awareness, and it is not our 
intent to study the effect of control practices on the awareness of specific risk domains. Our 
conceptual use of risk is in line with specifications in updated versions of popular ERM frameworks 
(ISO, 2018; COSO, 2017) and thus coherent with current risk thinking. Nevertheless, literature 
may benefit from future studies differentiating between different risk categories and investigating 
which control practice(s) might be more effective than other control practice(s) in managing 
specific types of risks. Finally, both the country-specific context and the SME context of our study 
limit the generalizability of our results. A useful extension would thus be to find out whether our 
findings still hold in other empirical contexts. Bearing these limitations in mind, we believe our 
study makes an important contribution to management accounting research.  
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TABLE 1 – Panel A 
Construct validity a 
Risk awareness (RA) (Reflectively measured)   
Cronbach’s α = 0.91 Composite reliability = 0.94 AVE = 0.79 Factor loadings 
Employees are aware of what top management expects from them with regard to dealing 
with risks 
0.808 
Employees have embedded risk thinking in their work modes 0.900 
Employees take risk aspects into consideration in their decision-making process 0.920 
Risk-aware actions and behaviors sustainably influence our business processes 0.726 
    
Interactive control (IC) (Formatively measured)  
Cronbach’s α: n/a Composite reliability: n/a AVE: n/a PCA loadings 
The top management team uses budgets and performance measures for the following:  
Provide a recurring and frequent agenda for top management activities 0.417 
Provide a recurring and frequent agenda for subordinate activities 0.458 
Enable continual challenge and debate of underlying data, assumptions and action plans 
with subordinates and peers 
0.465 
Focus attention on strategic uncertainties (i.e., factors that may invalidate current strategy 
or provide opportunities for new strategic initiatives) 
0.437 
Encourage and facilitate dialog and information sharing with subordinates 0.458 
  
Diagnostic control (DC) (Reflectively measured)  
Cronbach’s α = 0.90 Composite reliability = 0.93 AVE = 0.73 Factor loadings 
The top management team uses budgets and performance measures for the following:  
Identify critical performance variables (i.e., factors that indicate achievement of current 
strategy) 
0.849 
Set targets for critical performance variables 0.803 
Monitor progress toward critical performance targets 0.879 
Provide information to correct deviations from preset performance targets 0.858 
Review key areas of performance 0.666 
 
Formal risk management (FRM) (Formatively measured)  
Cronbach’s α: n/a Composite reliability: n/a AVE: n/a PCA loadings 
Our company has a standardized approach to determine the root cause of risks 0.425 
Our company classifies identified risks using ex-ante defined risk categories 0.448 
Our company estimates likelihood and impact of risks 0.462 
Our company takes systematic measures if risks develop unfavorably 0.458 
Our company regularly monitors the status of each risk 0.441 
 
 
Growth (GROWTH)  
Our firm experienced significant growth in the past three years n/a 
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Outcome history (OUTHIS) (Reflectively measured)  
Cronbach’s α = 0.72 Composite reliability = 0.83 AVE = 0.63 Factor loadings 
So far, we have not experienced any negative effects resulting from risky decisions 0.548 
We have analyzed past risky decisions in most cases correctly 0.771 
We have mostly had positive outcomes from risky decisions 0.723 
  
Perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) (Formatively measured)  
Cronbach’s α: n/a Composite reliability: n/a AVE: n/a PCA loadings 
How do you assess the predictability of changes in the following areas?  
Behavior and buying patterns of customers 0.420 
Behavior/strategies of competitors 0.502 
Technological developments in our company’s primary industry 0.412 
Behavior/strategies of your suppliers 0.457 
Legal/political developments 0.439 
 
Foreign sales (FS)  
How much revenue do you generate abroad? n/a 
  
Exploration (EXPLORATION) (Reflectively measured)  
Cronbach’s α = 0.86 Composite reliability = 0.90 AVE = 0.64 Factor loadings 
We look for novel technological ideas by thinking “outside the box” 0.735 
We create products or services that are innovative to the firm 0.802 
We look for creative ways to satisfy its customers’ needs 0.728 
We aggressively venture into new market segments 0.741 
We actively target new customers groups 
 
0.690 
Exploitation (EXPLOITATION) (Reflectively measured)  
Cronbach’s α = 0.77 Composite reliability = 0.86 AVE = 0.55 Factor loadings 
We commit to improve quality and lower cost 0.718 
We continuously improve the reliability of our products and services 0.746 
We constantly survey existing customers’ satisfaction 0.498 
We fine-tune what our firm offers to keep our current customers satisfied 0.761 
We penetrate more deeply into our existing customer base 0.592 
  
Risk-taking climate (RTC) (Reflectively measured)  
Cronbach’s α = 0.75 Composite reliability = 0.86 AVE = 0.67 Factor loadings 
Pursuing new business ideas, we encourage employees to take calculated risks 0.690 
We especially value both exploration and experimentation for opportunities 0.723 
Employees receive support and encouragement when presenting new ideas 0.614 
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Competitive intensity (CI) (Reflectively measured)  
Cronbach’s α = 0.87 Composite reliability = 0.92 AVE = 0.79 Factor loadings 
We face strong competitors in our industry 0.777 
Competition in our main industry is extremely high 0.924 
Price competition is a hallmark of our main industry 0.769 
  
a Panel A of Table 1 illustrates the results of factor analyses for the constructs used in this study. Factor loadings  
> 0.400 used in the final measurement of reflective constructs are in bold. For reflectively measured constructs we report 
the factor loadings based on common factor analysis (i.e., factor loadings). In line with Bedford and Malmi (2015), we 
examine the factor loadings for formatively measured constructs through principal components analysis (i.e., PCA 
loadings) and analyze the variance inflation factors (VIF) to assess multicollinearity. Consistent with prior literature PCA 
loadings > 0.300 are in bold and used in the final measurement of the formative constructs. The maximum VIF for the 
items of the formatively measured constructs is 3.35 and is thus well below the general threshold of 10 (Bedford & Malmi, 
2015). Furthermore, as items need not covary in formative constructs, conventional tests of validity and reliability are not 
appropriate (Bedford & Malmi, 2015). Thus, we do not calculate Cronbach’s α, composite reliability and AVE for our 
formative constructs (as indicated by n/a). 
 
 
TABLE 1 – Panel B 
Reflective-Formative Measurement Model Validation 
of Higher-Order Construct Tone From the Top b 
 
Top-down communication (TT) (Formative weight 0.47***, VIF = 1.32)  
Cronbach’s α = 0.82 Composite reliability = 0.89 AVE = 0.74 Factor loadings 
Top management … 1st Order 2nd Order 
… actively communicates risks and activities to be avoided by subordinates 0.827 0.678 
… communicates the importance of considering risks in business activities to all   
     employees 
0.913 0.759 
… emphasizes risk awareness as active component of the organization’s culture 0.834 0.628 
 
Bottom-up escalation (TT) (Formative weight 0.68***, VIF = 1.32)  
Cronbach’s α = 0.87 Composite reliability = 0.90 AVE = 0.65 Factor loadings 
As CEO I put special emphasis on ensuring … 1st Order 2nd Order 
… open communication channels and the fast transfer of risk-related information 0.699 0.663 
… informal and easy access to the top management team when it comes to important 
     risk-related topics 
0.823 0.758 
… that our corporate culture encourages employees to signal potential risks 0.815 0.749 
… a constructive challenge of beliefs, assumptions and associated risks 0.862 0.781 
… that employees are comfortable about raising dissenting opinions with regard to    
     risks 
0.820 
 
0.725 
 
b Panel B of Table 1 illustrates the measurement properties of the formative higher-order construct tone from the top using 
the first-order reflective constructs top-down communication and bottom-up escalation. The formative weights of the 
reflectively measured first-order dimensions are reported in brackets next to the construct labels. Using the repeated-
indicator approach implies that we use the manifest variables for both first-order and second-order constructs. Hence, for 
all items used we report both the loadings on the reflective first-order dimension and the loadings on the formative second-
order dimension. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics for survey constructs a 
Construct Min Mean Median Max Std. dev. 
Risk awareness (RA) 1.00 5.00 5.25 7.00 1.29 
Tone from the top (TT) 2.88 5.68 5.75 7.00 0.86 
Top-down communication 1.67 5.07 5.00 7.00 1.18 
Bottom-up escalation 2.80 6.05 6.20 7.00 0.88 
Interactive control (IC) 1.00 4.97 5.00 7.00 1.24 
Diagnostic control (DC) 1.00 5.34 5.60 7.00 1.25 
Formal risk management (FRM) 1.00 4.29 4.20 7.00 1.41 
Growth (GROWTH) 1.00 3.51 4.00 7.00 1.93 
Outcome history (OUTHIS) 1.00 4.86 5.00 7.00 1.17 
Perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) 1.60 3.87 4.00 6.20 0.90 
Foreign sales (FS) 0.00 28.50 10.00 100.00 34.04 
Exploration (EXPLORATION) 1.00 4.85 5.20 7.00 1.30 
Exploitation (EXPLOITATION) 2.60 5.57 5.60 7.00 0.89 
Risk-taking climate (RTC) 1.00 4.60 4.67 7.00 1.24 
Competitive intensity (CI) 1.00 5.64 6.00 7.00 1.30 
a We use factor scores for our reflectively measured constructs. For ease of interpretation, however, we report in this 
table the equally weighted means for the multi-item measures used.
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TABLE 3 
Multi-trait matrix a 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 RA 0.91               
2 TT 0.519*** n/a              
3 IC 0.309*** 0.472*** n/a             
4 DC 0.286*** 0.341*** 0.662*** 0.90            
5 FRM 0.488*** 0.488*** 0.251*** 0.347*** n/a           
6 Growth 0.182** 0.139* 0.069 0.091 0.152** n/a          
7 Age 0.075 -0.012 0.057 0.065 0.059 -0.040 n/a         
8 Size 0.268*** 0.186*** 0.168** 0.200*** 0.231*** 0.048 0.038 n/a        
9 OUTHIS 0.114 0.291*** 0.166** 0.106 0.235*** 0.154** 0.052 -0.112 0.72       
10 PEU -0.135* -0.169** -0.112 -0.078 -0.161** -0.190*** 0.060 -0.073 -0.065 n/a      
11 FS 0.205*** 0.188*** 0.089 0.064 0.174** 0.204*** 0.052 0.269*** 0.068 -0.078 n/a     
12 Exploration 0.244*** 0.344*** 0.335*** 0.269*** 0.220*** 0.290*** -0.012 0.199*** 0.088 -0.221*** 0.350*** 0.86    
13 Exploitation 0.287*** 0.401*** 0.349*** 0.255*** 0.303*** 0.278*** 0.008 0.220*** 0.163** -0.196*** 0.252*** 0.642*** 0.77   
14 RTC 0.203*** 0.341*** 0.390*** 0.289*** 0.170** 0.070 -0.083 0.067 0.204*** -0.203*** 0.219*** 0.604*** 0.376*** 0.75  
15 CI -0.107 -0.044 0.203*** 0.282*** -0.067 -0.220*** 0.148** -0.064 -0.043 0.186*** -0.168** -0.146** -0.095 0.105 0.87 
*, **, *** Indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively, two-tailed test. 
Please refer to Table 1 for a description of the multi-item constructs. 
a The diagonal of the matrix shows the Cronbach’s alpha for each variable. The other cells of the table report bivariate correlation coefficients. We do not calculate 
Cronbach’s alpha for formative constructs and single-item constructs (as indicated by n/a). 
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TABLE 4 
Cross-Tables7 
 
 Low IC  High IC  Total   Low DC  High DC  Total 
Low TT 
57 
(29%) 
 
29 
(14%) 
 86 
 
Low TT 
59 
(30%) 
 
27 
(13%) 
 86 
High TT 
43 
(22%) 
 
69 
(35%) 
 112 
 
High TT 
41 
(21%) 
 
71 
(36%) 
 112 
Total 100  98  198 
 
Total 100  98  198 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Observations were split at the mean values of TT, IC, and DC. Relative amount of observations per quadrants to total observations are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 5 
Payoff-function approach 
Hierarchical regression analysis – risk awareness as dependent variable 
 
Control variables 
only (Model 1) 
Main effects 
added (Model 2) 
Interaction effects 
added (Model 3) 
Intercept -1.509*** 
(0.530) 
-1.290** 
(0.515) 
-1.351***  
(0.513) 
FRM 0.262*** 
(0.046) 
0.184*** 
(0.049) 
0.184*** 
(0.049) 
Growth 0.023 
(0.033) 
0.029 
(0.032) 
0.035 
(0.032) 
Age 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Size 0.202** 
(0.094) 
0.165* 
(0.092) 
0.162* 
(0.091) 
Outcome history -0.015 
(0.075) 
-0.075 
(0.074) 
-0.080 
(0.073) 
PEU -0.002 
(0.069) 
0.006 
(0.066) 
-0.009 
(0.067) 
Foreign sales 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Exploration -0.024 
(0.105) 
-0.057 
(0.102) 
-0.049 
(0.102) 
Exploitation 0.113 
(0.090) 
0.048 
(0.089) 
0.040 
(0.089) 
Medium time horizon 0.215 
(0.182) 
0.167 
(0.177) 
0.196 
(0.175) 
Long-term time horizon 0.524** 
(0.209) 
0.344* 
(0.206) 
0.327 
(0.204) 
External management 0.125 
(0.124) 
0.138 
(0.120) 
0.137 
(0.119) 
Risk-taking climate 0.117 
(0.097) 
0.065 
(0.095) 
0.038 
(0.096) 
Competitive intensity -0.094 
(0.070) 
-0.111 
(0.071) 
-0.121* 
(0.070) 
†Industry dummies    
    
Tone from the top  0.279*** 
(0.077) 
0.335*** 
(0.083) 
Interactive control  0.030 
(0.069) 
0.010 
(0.069) 
Diagnostic control  0.030 
(0.085) 
0.031 
(0.086) 
    
Tone from the top * 
Interactive control 
  0.154** 
(0.068) 
Tone from the top * 
Diagnostic control 
  -0.070 
(0.083) 
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R² 0.3575 0.4148 0.4358 
F improvement of fit   4.93***            5.67***   3.20** 
n 198 198 198 
*, **, *** Indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively, two-tailed test. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
† For ease of illustration, the coefficients for the industry dummies are not presented. Compared to manufacturing firms 
wholesale firms (β ≈ 0.315, p < 0.10, two-tailed) display a significantly higher level of risk awareness.  
This table reports the payoff-function approach to test hypothesis 1 and our research question. 
Please refer to Table 1 for a description of the multi-item constructs. 
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TABLE 6 
Demand-function approach 
Panel A: Regression analysis 
 
Tone from  
the top 
Interactive  
control 
Diagnostic 
control 
Intercept -1.080** 
(0.463) 
-1.250** 
(0.579) 
-1.196** 
(0.463) 
Growth -0.019 
(0.035) 
-0.002 
(0.044) 
0.026 
(0.035) 
Age -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Size 0.185* 
(0.099) 
0.227* 
(0.124) 
0.219** 
(0.099) 
Outcome history 0.281*** 
(0.078) 
0.150 
(0.098) 
0.098 
(0.078) 
PEU -0.060 
(0.073) 
-0.050 
(0.092) 
-0.046 
(0.073) 
Foreign sales 0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Exploration 0.067 
(0.112) 
0.155 
(0.140) 
0.132 
(0.112) 
Exploitation 0.269*** 
(0.095) 
0.297** 
(0.119) 
0.095 
(0.095) 
Medium time horizon 0.118 
(0.194) 
0.351 
(0.243) 
0.279 
(0.194) 
Long-term time horizon 0.585*** 
(0.222) 
0.538* 
(0.278) 
0.429* 
(0.222) 
External management -0.016 
(0.132) 
-0.251 
(0.165) 
-0.020 
(0.132) 
Risk-taking climate 0.169 
(0.104) 
0.269** 
(0.130) 
0.111 
(0.104) 
Competitive intensity -0.005 
(0.074) 
0.258*** 
(0.093) 
0.328*** 
(0.074) 
†Industry dummies    
    
R² 0.3326 0.3206 0.2686 
F-value   4.67***            4.42***   3.44*** 
n 198 198 198 
Panel B: Conditional correlations 
  εTT  εIC  
      
 εIC 0.325***    
 εDC 0.211***  0.574***  
*, **, *** Indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively, two-tailed test. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
† For ease of illustration, the coefficients for the industry dummies are not presented in Panel A. Compared to 
manufacturing firms, firms offering professional, scientific, and technical services (β ≈ 0.554, p < 0.05, two-tailed) 
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display a significant and positive effect on tone from the top. Regarding interactive control retail firms (β ≈ 0.699, 
p < 0.05, two-tailed), firms in transportation and warehousing (β ≈ 0.690, p < 0.10, two-tailed), and firms engaged in 
wholesale trade (β ≈ 0.413, p < 0.10, two-tailed) display significantly higher levels compared to manufacturing firms. 
This table reports the demand-function approach for tone from the top, interactive control, and diagnostic control. 
Panel A reports the regressions of tone from the top, interactive control, and diagnostic control on their joint 
determinants. Panel B reports the overall correlation of the residuals derived from the regressions in Panel A. 
εTT, εIC, and εDC are the residuals obtained from regressing tone from the top (TT), interactive control (IC), and 
diagnostic control (DC) on their joint determinants. 
Please refer to Table 1 for a description of the multi-item constructs. 
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TABLE 7 
Payoff-function approach 
Regression analysis for low-PEU and high-PEU subsamples – risk awareness as dependent 
variable 
 
Low PEU 
(< 3.87) 
High PEU 
(≥ 3.87) 
Intercept -1.129** 
(0.518) 
-2.100*** 
(0.719) 
FRM 0.254*** 
(0.069) 
0.205*** 
(0.073) 
Growth 0.025 
(0.041) 
0.029 
(0.055) 
Age -0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Size 0.162 
(0.115) 
0.221 
(0.147) 
Outcome history -0.014 
(0.093) 
-0.130 
(0.122) 
Foreign sales 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Exploration -0.053 
(0.136) 
-0.288 
(0.178) 
Exploitation -0.029 
(0.112) 
0.154 
(0.151) 
Medium time horizon 0.287 
(0.217) 
0.362 
(0.291) 
Long-term time horizon 0.511* 
(0.260) 
0.356 
(0.321) 
External management 0.143 
(0.175) 
0.250 
(0.190) 
Risk-taking climate 0.205 
(0.144) 
0.025 
(0.143) 
Competitive intensity 0.061 
(0.084) 
-0.247* 
(0.129) 
†Industry dummies   
   
Tone from the top 0.368*** 
(0.111) 
0.220* 
(0.129) 
Interactive control -0.040 
(0.089) 
0.117 
(0.110) 
Diagnostic control -0.106 
(0.116) 
0.001 
(0.139) 
   
Tone from the top * Interactive control -0.089 
(0.090) 
0.374*** 
(0.114) 
Tone from the top * Diagnostic control 0.265** 
(0.121) 
-0.337** 
(0.137) 
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R² 0.6007 0.4801 
F-value   4.45***   2.96*** 
n 96 102 
*, **, *** Indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively, two-tailed test. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
† For ease of illustration the coefficients for the industry dummies are not presented. In the low-PEU subsample retail 
firms display a significantly higher level of risk awareness compared to manufacturing firms (β ≈ 0.459, p < 0.10, two-
tailed). In the high-PEU subsample firms engaged in wholesale trade (β ≈ 0.845, p < 0.01, two-tailed) and in 
transportation and warehousing (β ≈ 0.670, p < 0.10, two-tailed) display a significantly higher level of risk awareness 
compared to manufacturing firms.  
 
This table reports the payoff-function approach to test hypotheses 2abc. Based on a sample split at the mean value of 
PEU two subsamples are created. The payoff function is then estimated separately in both subsamples and finally the 
regression coefficients on the interaction terms are compared. There is a positive and significant difference for the 
interaction effect between tone from the top and interactive control between the high-PEU and low-PEU subsamples 
(p-value = 0.0011, two-tailed), the difference for the interaction effect between tone from the top and diagnostic control 
is also significantly different across the high-PEU and low-PEU subsamples (p-value = 0.0003). 
 
Please refer to Table 1 for a description of the multi-item constructs. 
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TABLE 8 
Alternative test for hypothesis 2 (conditional correlations) 
Panel A – comparison of pairwise condition correlations for high-PEU and low-PEU 
subsamples 
 PEU  ≥ 3.87  PEU  < 3.87 
 εIC  εIC 
εTT 0.309***  0.349*** 
 
 PEU  ≥ 3.87  PEU  < 3.87 
 εDC  εDC 
εTT 0.205**  0.229** 
    
Panel B – test of the complementary relationship between εTT and εIC as well as between εTT 
and εDC 
 εTT 
 Intercept  0.000 
(0.055) 
 PEU  -0.007 
(0.062) 
 εIC  0.252*** 
(0.054) 
 εIC * PEU  0.070 
(0.064) 
    
 R²  0.1111 
 F-value  8.08*** 
 n  198 
    
   εTT 
 Intercept  -0.000 
(0.057) 
 PEU  -0.008 
(0.064) 
 εDC  0.199*** 
(0.070) 
 εDC * PEU  0.130 
(0.085) 
    
 R²  0.0560 
 F-value  3.84** 
 n  198 
*, **, *** Indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively, two-tailed test. 
Panel A reports the complementarity analysis for the two pairs tone from the top and interactive control as well as tone 
from the top and diagnostic control. It shows the pairwise conditional correlations for the two subsamples split at the 
mean of PEU. 
Panel B uses the residuals of tone from the top and interactive control as well as tone from the top and diagnostic 
control to investigate whether PEU as continuous variable displays an effect on the relationship between the residuals. 
εTT, εIC and εDC are the residuals obtained from regressing tone from the top, interactive control, and diagnostic control 
on their joint determinants.  
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TABLE 9 
Payoff-function approach with three-way interactions 
Regression analysis with PEU as continuous variable – risk awareness as dependent 
variable 
  
Risk 
awareness 
Intercept -1.533*** 
(0.436) 
FRM 0.187*** 
(0.049) 
Growth 0.036 
(0.032) 
Age 0.001 
(0.001) 
Size 0.160* 
(0.092) 
Outcome history -0.066 
(0.073) 
Foreign sales 0.002 
(0.002) 
Exploration -0.053 
(0.102) 
Exploitation 0.049 
(0.090) 
Medium time horizon 0.309* 
(0.177) 
Long-term time horizon 0.432** 
(0.205) 
External management 0.165 
(0.122) 
Risk-taking climate 0.040 
(0.096) 
Competitive intensity -0.115 
(0.070) 
†Industry dummies  
  
Tone from the top 0.330*** 
(0.083) 
Interactive control 0.020 
(0.069) 
Diagnostic control 0.010 
(0.086) 
PEU -0.033 
(0.082) 
Tone from the top * Interactive control 0.143** 
(0.069) 
Tone from the top * PEU -0.049 
(0.083) 
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Interactive control * PEU 0.000 
(0.087) 
Tone from the top * Interactive control * PEU 0.214*** 
(0.078) 
Tone from the top * Diagnostic control -0.059 
(0.085) 
Diagnostic control * PEU 0.018 
(0.110) 
Tone from the top * Diagnostic control * PEU -0.260** 
(0.102) 
R² 0.4650 
F-value 4.84*** 
n 198 
*, **, *** Indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively, two-tailed test. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
† For ease of illustration, the coefficients for the industry dummies are not presented. Wholesale firms (β ≈ 0.374, 
p < 0.05, two-tailed) display a significantly higher level of risk awareness compared to manufacturing firms. 
 
This table reports an alternative specification of the payoff-function approach to test hypotheses 2abc. Contrary to 
Table 7, the analysis reported in this table investigates to what extent PEU as continuous variable exhibits an influence 
on the interaction effects between tone from the top and interactive control and tone from the top and diagnostic control. 
 
Please refer to Table 1 for a description of the multi-item constructs. 
 
 
